‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Marc Soulier C‑301/15. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Marc Soulier C‑301/15. إظهار كافة الرسائل

الجمعة، 12 أغسطس 2016

Compulsory collective management of copyright for images displayed by search engines: a French cultural exception to EU law

Olivia Klimis
A few weeks ago this Blog explored the possible of implications of a case currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Marc Soulier C-301/15, in particular should the Court follow the Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Wathelet. This reference for a preliminary ruling from France concerns the compatibility with EU law of the 2012 loi (Law No 2012-287 of 1 March 2012) adopted to allow and regulate the digital exploitation of out-of-print 20th century books. 

The AG held the view that such law is not really compatible with EU law because it envisages a mechanism that, contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, gives approved collecting societies - rather than authors - the right to authorise the reproduction and the representation in digital form of out-of-print books.

In my comment to the Opinion, I highlighted how the law on out-of-print books might not be the only case of potential incompatibility with EU law. In particular, in early July France introduced Loi No 2016-925 on la liberté de la création, l'architecture et patrimoine (freedom of creation, architecture and cultural heritage), which introduces new provisions into the French Intellectual Property Code (IPC) to regulate the publication of a plastic, graphic or photographic work by an online communication service. In particular, new Article 136-2(1) IPC provides that the publication of a plastic artwork, graphic or photographic work by an online communication service is subject to the consent, not of authors, but rather ... one or more collective management organisations (CMOs) appointed to this end by the French Ministry of Culture. 

But what are the exact principles and provisions governing the arrangement envisaged by new Article 136-2 CPI? Is there really a risk of incompatibility with EU law?

Katfriend Olivia Klimis (senior counsel at De Gaulle Fleurance & Associés, working between Brussels and Paris and specialising in IP and EU law), with the help of Nicolas Lescot (also at De Gaulle Fleurance & Associés), provides a thorough and thoughtful analysis.

“The great ride of [French] posterity”
(B Roubaud)
Here's what Olivia writes:

"As readers of this blog already know [here and here], on 7 July last the French Parliament passed the Bill no 2016-925 on freedom of creation, architecture and cultural heritage. Article 10 quater introduces Articles L 136-1 to L 136-4 into the IPC which provide for the compulsory collective management of copyright on images displayed by search engines.  
  
The exact meaning of Article L. 136 of the IPC

Article L.136-2 of the IPC can be translated as follows:

“I. The publication of a plastic artwork, graphic or photographic work from an online communication service shall entail the right of reproduction and the right of representation [i.e. communication to the public] of this work by automated images referencing services to be managed by one or several [collective management organizations] approved to this end by the Ministry of Culture. In the absence of designation [of a CMO] by the author or his successors in title at the work publication date, one of the CMOs is deemed to be in charge of the management of those rights.

II. The approved [CMOs] are solely entitled to conclude any agreement with automated images referencing services operators to authorize the reproduction and representation of plastic artworks, graphic or photographic works by these services and perceive the corresponding fees according to article L. 136-4 [Article L. 136-4 provides that the remuneration scheme and terms of payment will be set in agreements between CMOS and referencing services operators or, in the absence of such agreements,  by a commission composed equally of representatives from CMOs and referencing service operators]. The agreements concluded with the operators shall also specify how the operators will comply with their obligations to provide the CMOs with the works exploitation records and any information necessary to the distribution of the fees to the authors or their successors in title”.

This means that the referencing and display by search engines of all plastic artworks, graphic or photographic works made available online [by whom? The author? The law does not say…] is subject to the consent, not of authors, but of one approved CMO [whether it was appointed by the author as his or her representative of not…]. The CMO will set the remuneration scheme in agreement with the search engine operator, calculate the fees based on the records that will be sent by those operators regarding all copyright protected uses and distribute the fees collected to the authors.

This provision is another example of the French “cultural exception”. Whether it actually protects French culture, by depriving authors of the possibility to decide how they want to manage their rights and making their content more difficult to find, remains to be seen.

Can the French Senate crow
louder than the EU legislator?
The corridors of power – How the French Senate passed article 10 quater

When Article 10 quater was submitted to the Parliament, it was the subject of tremendous debates, rejected several times by the National Assembly at the request of government and restored each time by the Senate [see in particular here and here]. 
The French government opposed to that provision on the ground that it was contrary to EU law, in particular Svensson and the limitations of liability provided by the E-Commerce Directive. In their view, that question should be discussed in the context of the European copyright package.

The senators rebelled against the state of EU law regarding search engines and the slowness of the European Commission to “address boldly the Google issue across Europe”. In their view, it was urgent to protect artists and in particular photographers against misappropriation of theirs works by search engines.


Contrariety to EU law

As a matter of fact, Article L. 136 IPC appears to be incompatible with both the InfoSoc Directive and the E-Commerce Directive.

First of all, the compulsory collective management system provided violates the requirement set by Article 2(a) and Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive of a prior express consent by the author for any reproduction and communication to the public of his work. As highlighted by AG Wathelet’s Opinion in Marc Soulier, that consent is an essential prerogative of authors and, in the absence of EU derogating legislation, a tacit consent cannot be presumed. This harmonized rule applies not only to the assignment of rights stricto sensu but also to the collective management thereof (see previous post here).

HOW to record
copyright-protected
uses by search engines?!?
Secondly, by automatically empowering the CMOs to collect fees on behalf of the authors, Article L. 136 IPC is incompatible with Article 3 (1) of InfoSoc Directive whether in its current interpretation by the CJEU in Svensson and BestWater [here and here] or in its potential future interpretation following AG Wathelet’s Opinion in GS Media:

·   Either the work is publicly (and lawfully according to Svensson) available online, the referencing of the work by the search engine is not an act of communication to the public and thus may not be subject to the payment of a fee;
·       Or access to the work online is subject to restrictions which are circumvented by the search engine (or is unlawfully made available according to Svensson), the referencing is an act of communication to the public and thus requires the author’s prior express consent.

Moreover, since search engines usually display the results as thumbnails, this implies a resizing of the pictures, ie an adaptation which might also require the author prior express consent under the right of reproduction (Article 2 (a) of the InfoSoc Directive). As observed during the debates at the Parliament, this question has not yet been clarified by the CJEU, so that the hyperlinking saga is far from over.

Last but not least, having search engines pay for all natural results displayed by their automated referencing services appears to be incompatible with the safe harbour set by Article 14 of E-Commerce Directive, as interpreted by CJEU in Google France.

The qualification of Google Images as a hosting service was acknowledged by the Paris Court of Appeal and French Supreme Court in the Aufeminin case. Here, the resizing of images  was held to be an automated technical act required by the functionnality of the search engine.

A Google Images’ Kat worried
of being tracked
by a French CMO
And how to record copyright protected uses in practice? Not even the CJEU is quite sure about what is lawful or not. In the absence of notifications by right holders, the recording obligation may place an excessive burden on search engines and therefore be contrary to Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, as interpreted in the SABAM/Netlog case. This is supported by the Supreme Court judgment in the Aufeminin case.
  
Do we have to worry?

Whatever the CJEU decides with regard to hyperlinking in the future, it seems that the French legislator will not find a way to justify Article L. 136 IPC under EU law. The only escape is through the creation of a new provision in the copyright package, which could be inspired from the private copying levy system (Article 5.2 (b) of the InfoSoc Directive).

In the absence of EU derogation, the implementation of Article L. 136 IPC, which requires agreements to be found between CMOs and referencing services operators, will likely face practical difficulties. In particular, it can be expected that search engines operators will not agree to pay a levy which is contrary to EU law.  In fact, similar initiatives regarding press content in Spain and Germany even led Google to de-reference national newspapers or even deactivate its Google news service."

Thanks so much for this great analysis Olivia!

الجمعة، 8 يوليو 2016

AG Wathelet advises CJEU to hold French law on out-of-print books incompatible with EU law

AG Melchior Wathelet
Amidst all the madness hectic legislative activity surrounding orphan works and out-of-print books that took place in Europe in the first half of 2010s (also as a reflection and echo of the unfolding Google Books saga in the US), in 2012 France adopted a loi (Law No 2012-287 of 1 March 2012) to allow and regulate the digital exploitation of out-of-print 20th century books.

This piece of legislation amended the French Code de la propriété intellectuelle by adding a new chapter (Chapter IV - Articles L 134-1 to L 134-9, subsequently amended) to Title III of Book I therein. 

Among other things, this French law gives approved collecting societies the right to authorise the reproduction and the representation in digital form of out-of-print books, while allowing the authors of those books, or their successors in title, to oppose or put an end to that practice subject to certain conditions. 

More specifically, the relevant implementing decree has established a legal framework intended to encourage the digital exploitation of works reproduced in books published in France before 1 January 2001 which are no longer commercially distributed by a publisher and are not published in print or digital format. In that case the right to authorise the reproduction or performance of those books in digital format is exercised, six months after their registration in a publicly accessible database for which the National Library of France is responsible, by collecting societies approved to do so by the Minister responsible for culture.

But is an arrangement of this kind compatible with EU law, notably the InfoSoc Directive? Among other things, Article 2(a) and 3(1) of that directive, in fact, provide authors - not collecting societies - with the right to authorise the reproduction and communication to the public of their works.

This is the question at the core of the reference for a preliminary ruling lodged by the French Conseil d’État and currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This is Marc Soulier C-301/15.

Yesterday Advocate General Wathelet issued his Opinion in this case, advising the Court [not really surprisingly, also considering recent CJEU decisions like Reprobel, noted here] to rule in the sense of the incompatibility of French law with EU law.

Background

The applicants in the national proceedings have lodged an application with the Conseil d’État. They seek the annulment for misuse of powers of Law No 2012-287 implementing decree, on grounds that the Law on out-of-print books is not compatible with the limitations and exceptions to the right to authorise the reproduction of a copyright work which are exhaustively set out in the InfoSoc Directive.

Further to a reference to the Conseil constitutionnel in 2013 regarding the compatibility of Law No 2012-287 with the French Constitution [in 2014 the Conseil constitutionnel responded in the sense of its compatibility], the 
Conseil d’État decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to the CJEU:

Do [Articles 2 and 5] of [the InfoSoc Directive] … preclude legislation, such as that [established in Articles L. 134-1 to L. 134-9 of the Intellectual Property Code], that gives approved collecting societies the right to authorise the reproduction and the representation in digital form of “out-of-print books”, while allowing the authors of those books, or their successors in title, to oppose or put an end to that practice, on the conditions that it lays down?’

The AG Opinion

First: what needs to be considered?

The AG noted at the outset that, although the question referred by the Conseil d’État relates to Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive, the digitisation and making available of a book also calls into consideration Article 3(1) [right of communication to the public]. This is because [para 26] the digital exploitation of copyright books constitutes ‘reproduction’ and ‘communication to the public’ of a work, which require individual and separate authorisation by the author, unless those acts are covered by an exception or a limitation provided for in Article 5 of that directive.

According to the AG, to answer the question posed by the French court, consideration of Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive is unnecessary. This is because [para 28] legislation such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings is not included in the detailed and exhaustive list of exceptions and limitations in Article 5. 

The scope of exclusive rights

Having clarified what provisions need to be considered and recalled the rationale [high protection of authors] and interpretation of InfoSoc provisions ['autonomous' and 'uniform' where no express reference is made to Member States' laws], the AG turned to the consideration of the scope of relevant exclusive rights.

He held [paras 38-39] that: 

"Article 2(a) and Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 require the prior express consent of the author for any reproduction or communication to the public of his work, including in digital format. That consent constitutes an essential prerogative of authors.
In the absence of any derogating EU legislation, the author’s express and prior consent for the reproduction or communication to the public of his work cannot be eliminated, assumed or limited by substituting it with tacit consent or a presumed transfer which the author must oppose within a fixed time limit and in accordance with conditions laid down by national law. It follows that national legislation like the decree at issue, which replaces the author’s express and prior consent with tacit consent or a presumption of consent, deprives the author of an essential element of his intellectual property rights."

The AG added that none of the following characteristics of the French law alter such finding, ie: the possibility of opposition and withdrawal; the right to remuneration, and the absence of commercial distribution of the work to the public. 

The scope of EU preemption

The AG also rejected the argument that the legislation at issue would not affect the protection of copyright because it simply constitutes an arrangement for managing certain rights which Article 2(a) and Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 do not preclude. According to the AG [paras 55-57], 

"such a view of copyright runs counter to Article (2)(a) and Article 3(1) of [the InfoSoc] Directive. In providing for the author’s exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the reproduction and communication to the public of his works, those provisions also concern the way in which those rights are exercised by the author.
While it is true that [the InfoSoc] Directive 2001/29 neither harmonises nor prejudices the arrangements concerning the management of copyright which exist in Member States, the EU legislature, in providing that authors enjoy, in principle, exclusive rights to authorise or prohibit the reproduction of their work and its communication to the public, exercised its competence in the field of intellectual property.
In those circumstances, the Member States can no longer adopt management arrangements which compromise EU legislation, even if this is done with the intention of furthering a public interest objective. Before management of the rights of reproduction and communication to the public can be taken into consideration, the holder of those exclusive rights must have authorised a management organisation to manage his rights."

Comment
Gentle reminder

This is yet another thoughtful Opinion by AG Wathelet, which in my view is entirely correct. Let's see if the CJEU agrees.

Two further points worth raising are the following.

First, it seems to me that lately AGs have taken protection of 'authors' [rather than - more generically - rightholders] particularly at heart. Besides yesterday's Opinion of AG Wathelet, another recent example that comes to mind is the Opinion of AG Szpunar in Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v Stichting Leenrecht, C-174/15 [the 'e-lending case', currently in progress and noted here], in which he clearly stated [para 34] that "the principal objective of copyright is to safeguard the interests of authors".

Secondly, should the CJEU follow the Opinion of AG Wathelet [which seems natural, considering recent jurisprudence] the French law on out-of-print books may not be the only piece of legislation incompatible with EU law. 

Staying in France, only yesterday Loi No 2016-925 on la liberté de la création, l'architecture et patrimoine (freedom of creation, architecture and cultural heritage) was published in the Journal officiel de la République française [this blog reported on this legislative initiative when it was at the draft stage]. 

Among other things, Article 30 of Loi No 2016-925 introduces new provisions into the Code de la propriété intellectuelle to regulate the publication of a plastic, graphic or photographic work by an online communication service. In particular, new Article 136-2(1) states the following:

"La publication d'une œuvre d'art plastique, graphique ou photographique à partir d'un service de communication au public en ligne emporte la mise en gestion, au profit d'une ou plusieurs sociétés régies par le titre II du livre III de la présente partie et agréées à cet effet par le ministre chargé de la culture, du droit de reproduire et de représenter cette œuvre dans le cadre de services automatisés de référencement d'images. A défaut de désignation par l'auteur ou par son ayant droit à la date de publication de l'œuvre, une des sociétés agréées est réputée gestionnaire de ce droit." 

This means that the publication of a plastic artwork, graphic or photographic work by an online communication service is subject to the consent, not of authors, but rather ... one or more collecting societies appointed to this end by the French Ministry of Culture. 

I look forward to reading further commentaries on this new piece of French legislation but, in light of AG Wathelet's analysis and previous CJEU case law, it does not seem that Loi No 2016-925 is entirely compatible with EU law. 

But what do readers (especially French) think?